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ABSTRACT 
This thesis focuses on the status of Palestinian refugees following final peace 
negotiations. The major conclusions of the thesis are that basic Palestinian refugee rights 
are not likely to be honored given the immense imbalance of power between Israel and 
the PLO; that the Palestinian refugee community will likely become a permanently 
marginalized outcast group in the Middle East; and that the probable result of this 
condition will be an increase in Palestinian political violence and terrorism against 
Israeli, American, and allied Arab interests. This is likely to be achieved through 
mobilization of former refugees by Islamic fundamentalist groups, capitalizing on the 
failure of the nationalist peace effort. These conclusions are reached through a close 
examination of the specific Palestinian refugee question and applying a general model of 
ethnonationalist collective action to the Palestinian question. The major policy 
conclusion for the United States is that to protect its own interests in the Middle East and 
reduce violence, the United States must treat seriously the rights of Palestinian refugees 
during regional peace negotiations. American and Israeli interests on this key issue are 
clearly divergent; they should be recognized as such and treated accordingly. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In Palestine, the nationalists are failing, and the Islamists are on the rise. The 
rights of Palestinian refugees have not been addressed in primary negotiations due to the 
insistence by Israel that such issues be delayed until final status talks. Instead, the 
refugee issue has been relegated to unofficial, non-binding negotiations headquartered in 
Ottawa. The demands which the refugees make do not rest on random proclamations of 
some revolutionary leader, but rather the resolutions and proclamations of the United 
Nations. 
In this case, the interests of the U.S. and Israel are clearly divergent. Standing 
with Israel puts us on the side opposite justice as defined by American words over the last 
fifty years. Turning our backs on the refugees now, robs the United States of any moral 
or ethical leadership among the nations of the world. Henceforward, America would 
remain as a superpower whose leadership rests solely on pillars of military and economic 
dominance. 
Concluding negotiations without respect for realistic refugee concerns will 
expand the conflict throughout the region as relocated Palestinian communities strike 
back at the Westerners who "tricked" them, the Arabs who "used" them, and the PLO 
who "surrendered" their struggle. Mobilization of former refugee populations would 
occur largely through the efforts and organization of Islamist groups such as Hamas and 
Islamic Jihad, which promise their members simple justice above all else. The drive for 
"justice" ideally coincides with the primary desires of the refugees and leaves that 
population ripe for manipulation and exploitation. Current plans that deny the Palestinian 
IX 
right of return and negate the rights to compensation as promised in United Nations 
Resolution 194 (III), play directly into the hands of the radical elements of Palestinian 
society. 
The PA has failed to deliver on a broad range of social programs, and the 
UNRWA has been overwhelmed by budgetary constraints and sheer demographics. 
Because of this, the promise of good health care and education for their members ensures 
the Islamists solid representation at all of their events and infuses people with the belief 
that maybe the religious groups can succeed where the nationalists have failed. 
Israel possesses overwhelming advantages in bilateral negotiations and continuing 
to pretend that America is playing the honest broker by allowing the two sides to handle 
the situation themselves is to silently give Israel carte blanche. Without diplomatic 
pressure from the United States, Israel has little incentive to relinquish land and resources 
it has already proven it can militarily hold. Assisting the parties to settle the conflict with 
due respect for refugee rights would not only improve the security situation in the 
territories of Israel and Palestine, it would also quiet the opposition of many of America's 
biggest supporters in the region who would be robbed of their bogeyman in the form of 
the "Zionist/U.S. oppressors." By taking a behind the scenes position of intense 
diplomatic pressure on Israel while at the same time renewing our commitment to the 
security of the Jewish state, it may be possible to bring about a solution which treats the 
refugee hardships of the last fifty years with proper respect without jeopardizing the 
security concerns of Israel. Most importantly, the U.S. must realize that a settlement in 
this conflict will settle nothing unless it adequately addresses refugee rights. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The twentieth century was witness to an explosion of ethnic conflicts. In the 
latter part of the twentieth century, ethnic groups began asserting their rights to self- 
determination and self-rule in opposition to what were often foreign colonial powers. It 
has not been unusual for the dominant power in a region to deny the existence of a 
particular ethnic group, such as the Turkish dismissal of Kurds as "mountain Turks," and 
the famous quote from Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir that "there is no such thing as 
the Palestinian people." These disadvantaged communal or ethnic groups fall broadly 
into the categories of national peoples or minority peoples, with the differentiating trait 
essentially being that national peoples seek autonomy from the states that rule them while 
minority peoples seek greater access to or control of, power within the state (Gurr, 1993, 
pp. 3-15). 
Within the category of national peoples a further classification as 
ethnonationalists is given to those groups that constitute relatively large, regionally 
concentrated populations that for much of their history possessed either de jure or de 
facto autonomy and who are pursuing separatist objectives today against the ruling 
regime (Gurr, 1993, pp. 19-20). It is the ethnonationalist desire for self-rule that forms 
the basis for this research paper. 
A framework for ethnonationalist activism will be constructed in Chapter II, 
supported by evidence from communal groups in similar circumstances. Once this 
framework is established, Chapters III, IV, and V will examine the situation the 
Palestinian refugees face today, proposed solutions to the refugee problem, and the ability 
of the Palestinian Authority (PA) to absorb refugees, respectively. Using the information 
established in these three chapters, Chapter VI will apply their information to the 
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framework established in Chapter II to forecast potential reactions of the Palestinian 
people, and the refugees in particular, to proposed "final status" issues in the Israeli- 
Palestinian peace process. Finally, Chapter VII will bring everything together and draw 
out the relevant policy recommendations from the preceding arguments. 
Assuming that the peace process continues onward following a cessation of the 
current hostilities, it seems a reasonable proposition that the Palestinian population- 
particularly the refugees-are not going to be satisfied with the outcome. Their 
dissatisfaction, however, is likely to meet with indifference and the perceived lack of 
legal recourse in the international community following the signing of documents 
declaring an "end of conflict" by the PA. Such signatures would eliminate any claims by 
Palestinians beyond those settlements agreed to in negotiations. 
If the conflict is "resolved" by paying compensation or reparations to 
governments instead of refugees with fewer Palestinians living in the West Bank and 
Gaza than before the Oslo Accords, with those remaining in the PA isolated from each 
other by Israeli settlements, how will the Palestinian people react? Specifically, what 
regional security environment will likely evolve from the dissatisfaction of the 
Palestinian people with the conclusion of final status talks? 
A population of former refugees who still believe their rights have not been 
addressed following the failure of nationalist efforts to negotiate peace will be susceptible 
to mobilization along Islamic lines. Furthermore, their anger and sense of official 
alienation is likely to lead to an increase in political violence directed towards America, 
Israel, and allied Arab states, which the refugees will view as having betrayed their i cause. 
The Palestinian people possess a resolute determination to retain their identity and regain 
their homeland as defined by international bodies. Their Palestinian identity plays an 
enormous role in their daily lives and their feelings of abandonment by the international 
community as well as their Palestinian leadership, will result in greater instability in the 
region than is experienced today without a peace settlement. 
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II. ETHNONATIONALISM 
A. DEVELOPMENT OF ETHNIC IDENTITY 
What exactly comprises an ethnic group? Christopher Dandekers' book, 
Nationalism and Violence, defines an ethnic or communal group as possessing these 
characteristics: (Dandeker, 1998, pp. 22-23) 
1. A collective proper name. 
2. A myth of common ancestry. 
3. Shared historical memories. 
4. One or more differentiating elements of common culture. 
5. An association with a specific homeland. 
6. A sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population. 
This identity can be transitory, and what is important to a particular ethnic group is the 
strength of identity at a particular place and time. In Minorities at Risk, Ted Robert Gurr 
states that what is most important to Group identity is whether the ethnic group feels that 
their perceived differences from the larger society are significant enough to set them 
apart from others (Gurr, 1993, p. 3). Therefore, outside perceptions and judgments of 
the validity of a certain groups identities are irrelevant if the group members perceive a 
difference, and vice versa. 
The mere existence of an ethnic identity, however, does little to explain the desire 
by certain groups to pull away from the larger society or to demand greater participation 
in governance. To understand such desires, it is necessary to establish some way to 
gauge the strength of the identity itself. It would seem obvious that something must be 
working in the society to influence not only the perceived need for the creation or revival 
of the groups identity, but also its sustenance and vitality. As in the establishment of the 
identity itself, there are criteria that may be used to evaluate the strength of ones ethnic 
identity: (Gurr, 1993, pp. 124-129) 
1. Extent of collective disadvantage. 
2. The salience of group identity. 
3. The extent of group cohesion and mobilization. 
4. Repressive control by dominant groups. 
When speaking of "collective disadvantage," what is important are the differences 
within the social spectrum in terms of quality of life or access to political participation 
compared with other groups under the same government. These disadvantages generally 
fall into three categories. The first type of disadvantage is one of political or economic 
disfavor: Within the larger society, are the members of the group treated differently from 
others in terms of access to political or economic advancement based solely on their 
ethnic identity? This takes many varied forms around the world, from the "Jim Crowe" 
laws of the U.S. Southern States that helped to unite African-Americans across the 
country, to the former Yugoslavia where Serbs were grossly over represented in 
governmental and military positions, thus pushing that country toward Civil War. 
Groups may be disadvantaged based entirely on the degree of cultural, racial or 
religious differences from the dominant groups. The differences measured here are in 
terms of language, ethnicity, religion, social customs, rural or urban heritage, and 
historical origin. Unfortunately, examples of such cases abound. Some of the most 
brutal examples stem from seemingly minor differences, such as the distinction between 
Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda, Protestant and Catholic in Northern Ireland, or Serbs and 
Croats in the Former Yugoslavia. 
Demographic and ecological stresses also define the nature of an ethnic conflict. 
Particularly acute in regions experiencing resource shortages such as the Middle East or 
Sub-Saharan Africa, the disadvantages here, while perhaps the most difficult to frame, 
are quite literally matters of life and death for group members. Problems of denial of 
access to resources and nonexistent or ineffective waste removal programs based on 
ethnic identity are common. Moreover, they often combine with rapid family growth due 
to cultural traditions and lack of access to family planning programs to create 
demographic and ecological disasters that heighten tensions between groups. 
The second of the four factors determining the strength of ethnic identity concerns 
the salience ofthat identity. It is important to judge not only intergroup conflict that may 
wear on allegiance, but also the intensity of past or ongoing conflicts with the dominant 
group and how those serve to unite or divide the greater group. The example of Northern 
Ireland, where past historical conflicts between mostly Catholic Irishmen and mostly 
Protestant Englishmen over the course of several centuries has devolved into loyalist and 
republican activists divided cleanly down sectarian lines. If the historical conflict had not 
been so intense, it is unlikely that the animosities that exist today would still be in place 
and divided along such rigid identities. Similarly, one has only to travel the American 
South to hear young men weave tall tales about their states performance in the Civil War, 
before immediately transitioning into defense of "American values" to an outsider. There 
is intergroup conflict based on past events but the dominant identity is still that of being 
an American. 
The extent of group cohesion and mobilization is where the real strength of 
identity lies, and it is the third determinant overall. It is the heart of the identity, precisely 
because without it the other three determinants lose much of their meaning. A 
collectively disadvantaged ethnic group, that takes its identity seriously, is of little 
political threat to a repressive controlling regime if it cannot work together towards a 
common goal or harness its human potential. Likewise, a group that is able to rise above 
internecine feuds and work towards achievement of the ethnonationalist goal is a force to 
be taken seriously. The campaigns of Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. stand as 
testimony to the powers of cohesion and mobilization, and the resultant strength it brings 
to a cause. 
The final element of group strength and one that in many ways determines the 
intensity of the identity itself is the amount of repressive control by dominant groups. 
The more repressed a group is because of its identity, the stronger that identity becomes, 
much to the frustration of the repressive agent. Contrary to common beliefs, harsh 
control and domination of a group may actually do more to incite rebellion than it does to 
diffuse opposition. 
B. IDENTITY ORIENTATIONS 
It has been demonstrated to this point that there exists a specific set of factors 
which serve to not only define an ethnic group, but that also determine the strength of 
that ethnic identity to the individuals both inside and outside of the group. Once the 
group has established a strong sense of identity, a format is required for determining what 
their actions are likely to be in relation to the outgroup.1 
In the book Nationalism and Violence, social psychologist Assaad Azzi describes 
a set of variables, represented in Table 1, which is useful in determining whether an 
ethnic group is likely to assimilate, integrate, separate, or marginalize itself in the larger 
culture. The manner in which groups direct their efforts relates to whether the first 
contact between groups was voluntary, the group's numerical size, the group's relative 
position in the power structure, and other determining factors. The matrix formed from 
1
 In this paper, the term "ingroup" will be used to define members of the minority group, and "outgroup" 
shall designate those members of the greater society that are not members of the particular ethnic group. 
this is based on simple "yes" or "no" answers to the questions of whether an ethnic group 
wants to retain a separate identity and whether they wish to have positive relations with 
the outgroup. 
Table 1. 
Identity Orientations of Minority Groups (ingroup) 
In relation to the Majority (outgroup). After Azzi, 1998, pp. 95-96. 







Yes Integration Assimilation 
No Separation Marginalization 
The author goes on to explain that the four identities to be assumed fall into three broad 
categories. Assimilation, as it is a matter of personal choice and desires, is distinctly 
individualistic. However, integration and separation are group interests since they both 
require the retention of group identity and therefore, group cohesion. Finally, in the 
unique case, marginalization is a group identity irrespective of individual or group 
interests, and is imposed more than chosen. 
In cultural groups with a high level of individualism, assimilation is the most 
likely course of action, as there is little stigma attached to cross-group mobility. More 
plainly, a society where individual success is highly valued contains no barriers for an 
individual entering another socioeconomic class. When an ethnic group finds itself in a 
situation where assimilation is possible, intragroup differences are likely to arise. Those 
most able to benefit from assimilation due to education, training, or language ability are 
most likely to make the leap to the outgroup. The potential result of this type of 
assimilation is the robbing of the nonassimilated ethnic community of its skilled members 
and resources, making collective action more difficult and raising the likely specter of 
intra-group conflict. 
As a course of action, marginalization as discussed by Azzi is less of a choice and 
more of an outcome in terms of identity. Even if an ethnic group does not want to retain 
its distinct culture and looks upon the outgroup favorably, the larger society may still 
exclude them and leave them on the periphery. In the middle of the twentieth century in 
America, as African-Americans in many parts of the country attempted to assimilate 
during this time into the larger culture, the majority white population rejected them. 
Unlike assimilation, integration, as Table 1 shows, results when the ethnic group 
desires to maintain positive relations with the outgroup while retaining its culture as well. 
In practice, the reality of this orientation is that ingroup members will usually desire to 
maintain some aspects of their traditional culture while incorporating some aspects of the 
outgroups culture. The result of this is a form of cultural pluralism or biculturalism that 
allows for incorporation and expression of elements from each culture. 
The remaining identity to discuss is also potentially the most important. The 
separatist identity arises from a desire to retain an ethnic identity while at the same time 
refusing positive relations with the outgroup. Peoples embracing this identity orientation 
are those leading the ethnonationalist drives for states of their own throughout the world. 
C. MOBILIZATION TO COLLECTIVE ACTION 
Separation is a goal more easily spoken than achieved, as the real test is whether 
one can mobilize others of their ethnic group to the same cause and convince them of the 
necessity for collective action. The cornerstone of such mobilization lies in an appeal to 
efficacy beliefs. 
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Both individual and collective efficacy beliefs and their associated cultural values 
are critical to determining the potential for collective action. In societies with a strong 
corporatist structure, there is less likelihood of individuals striking out on their own in 
opposition to the group, which therefore makes such cultures ideally suited for 
mobilization. But, in order for the ideas of collective self-efficacy to take hold, the 
individual must believe three things: 1) Collective action has a chance at achieving some 
of the desired results; 2) Other people in the group are willing to participate in the action; 
3) The group possesses the means to achieve their goals. This is a simple concept to 
illustrate, as it is not likely that people will risk bodily injury in opposing government 
security personnel if there is no hope of achieving anything and there is not likely to be 
anyone else out wanting to take direct action. People have to believe that at least a large 
part of the society is behind them to motivate them to collective action. (Azzi, 1998. 
pp.103) 
There is a large difference between those that support the collective action in a 
moral sense and those that actually get out in the street and take part in the necessary civil 
disobedience. This "free-rider" problem, in which there is little reason for someone to 
risk harm supporting the cause if they can watch safely from a distance and reap the 
benefits of others success, is overcome through the promotion of participatory self- 
efficacy. If this can be established, if people really believe that their participation will 
have a meaningful positive effect on the achievement of the groups' goals, then the final 
and perhaps greatest hurdle to collective action will have been surmounted. (Azzi, 1998. 
pp. 103-104) 
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However, a note of caution must be given when it comes to the articulation of 
collective grievances by those who are taking action. As discussed by Gurr, (1993, pp. 
68-69) there are four points to keep in mind regarding the professed motives of 
ethnonationalist movements: 
1. Collective interests are not unitary. In every disadvantaged group there 
are those who would prefer to retain the status quo or act to preserve 
distinct interests that may be at odds with the best interests of the ingroup. 
2. Political organization is essential to the formulation and expression of 
collective interests. Despite the feelings of discrimination or alienation 
felt by individuals, the organized expression of collective interests counts 
politically. 
3. Some political expressions of collective interest are more authentic than 
others. In the early stages of a political movement, group members are 
subjected to numerous potential organizers trumpeting the benefits of 
particular movements. Group members must then decide what is most 
important by the granting or withholding of support from each movement. 
In general, the most authentic representations of group concern come from 
the largest organizations. 
4. Group interests and objectives change during the course of the communal 
conflict. While conflict with an external foe normally increases cohesion, 
there is no evidence to suggest movements regularly become more or less 
radical as conflicts progress. Government concession and/or repression 
can affect the solidarity of groups by alienating the most dovish or 
moderate members in both cases. 
This chapter has established three things: First, for an ethnonationalist movement 
to exist, people need only to view themselves as being separate from the outgroup 
regardless of what others may believe. Second, there are essentially four different 
identity orientations which an ethnic group may pursue within the larger society, or 
which may be imposed upon them in the case of marginalization. Finally, ethnic identity 
and a separatist orientation mean little if the problems of individual, participatory, and 
collective efficacy are not resolved in such a way that they enhance the propensity for 
collective action. 
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The leaders of any ethnonationalist movement may take deliberate steps designed 
to manipulate efficacy beliefs and focus on differences between the ingroup and outgroup 
so as to motivate the group to action. Specifically, they may take steps to weaken the 
belief in individual self-efficacy by constraining the exit choices from the group. Put 
plainly, this occurs when an individual's belief that he can successfully assimilate and 
thus avoid the hardships of his ingroup is continually weakened until such point that he 
believes the only option is to "stick with his people." If they can then be convinced that 
other members of the group are waiting to support them in collective action and that their 
participation is crucial, oftentimes by invoking patriotic nationalistic myths, the 
likelihood of their taking part in demonstrations, protests, and other collective actions 
increases exponentially. 
D. ETHNONATIONALISTS IN THE REAL WORLD: THE KURDS 
There has long existed a region known as Kurdistan, yet except for a few fleeting 
fragmentary attempts at government, there has never been a Kurdish State. Today, 
Kurdistan is spread over the borders of five established states: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Armenia, 
and Turkey and in each state, their population forms a minority. The experience of these 
populations has been far from uniform as each state has pursued separate policies towards 
the Kurds. Comprised mostly of Sunni Muslims, they are traditionally pastoralist 
seminomadic mountain tribes that have migrated in recent years to many of the regional 
urban centers. They believe that they were descended from the Medes, of the ancient 
Persian Empire and speak a variety of broadly ranging dialects, based on the Kurmanji 
language, and thus share common religion, language and myths of origin. (Gurr/Harff, 
1994. pp. 28-32) 
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Based upon a history of fierce independence and resistance to outsiders common 
to mountain tribes the world over, the Kurds have almost universally retained a strong 
sense of identity and have refused assimilation. Integration however, is another matter. 
Remember that integration is most likely when the ingroup wishes to retain its separate 
identity, yet it still desires positive relations with the outgroup. This is the situation in 
which most Kurdish populations find themselves today. (Harff, 1993. pp. 226-227) 
Despite several notable exceptions, the Kurds have been largely successful with 
their integration into their host countries, desiring in most places greater autonomy, 
instead of true independence. The largest exception to this statement exists in present- 
day Iraq where the Kurdish population has gone through many different iterations of its 
relationship with Saddam Hussein. Despite desires to integrate in the mid-1970s, they 
have since been marginalized and subsequently harshly persecuted by the regime. 
(Gurr/Harff, 1994. pp. 41-43) 
Much like the Palestinian population, the Kurds were promised an independent 
Kurdistan by the international community at the Treaty of Sevres in 1920, but that state 
did not come to pass due to power politics of major states at the time. Instead, the closest 
they came to independence was the insignificant Mahabad Republic formed on a portion 
of Iranian Kurdistan when Soviet forces invaded in 1945. It was but another opportunity 
for the Kurdish population to be used by the international community for the achievement 
of goals contrary to their interests, and the Province was gone a year later when the 
Soviets withdrew. In the Iraqi case cited above, whereby the Kurds were becoming 
closer and closer to integrating into the Iraqi state, it was political manipulation by the 
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Shah of Iran that led to the assumption of a disastrous uprising against Hussein whose 
effects are still being felt. 
The rebellion against Hussein was originated and sustained through effective 
manipulation of efficacy beliefs by the leadership of the various Kurdish opposition 
groups. Harsh repression of group members by the regime played into the hands of the 
opposition as it marginalized Kurds and greatly constrained their exit strategies from the 
conflict, for wherever they went within the region they would be persecuted because of 
their ethnic identity. In effect, they were cornered. Utilizing the notion of "sticking with 
ones own kind" together at various times with the belief that either the Shah or the United 
States was going to support their efforts, the Kurdish people believed that success was 
achievable and they took up arms on a large scale. When that support never materialized 
in either case, they were crushed. 
Despite promises of independence from the international community, their use as 
pawns in great power political gambits, and their repeated dislocation and defeat 
militarily, the Kurds still continue their drive for autonomy. This drive is fed by a strong 
sense of identity founded on shared belief systems and the notion that they are different 
from the groups around them whether they are Turkish, Persian, or Arab. Their case is 
similar in many respects to that of the Palestinians, though as shall be shown in the 
remainder of this work there remain key differences between the two groups. Perhaps 
foremost among the differences is the idea that the achievement of a state is more of a 
reality for the Palestinians as they possess land in the West Bank and Gaza which belongs 
to no other state, while the Kurdish population is spread across many borders. 
Additionally, the Palestinian case is perhaps easier to internationalize due to the regional 
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importance of the conflict and the large scale cultural and racial differences between the 
groups, whereas the Kurds and their neighbors are not easily distinguishable to an 
outsider. 
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III. THE PALESTINIAN SITUATION TODAY 
Because we did not have any land, the PLO itself was the 
embodiment of our nation. But Oslo was a big blow to the Palestinian 
refugees in the Diaspora. Many feel let down. Oslo hasn't given anything 
to the Diaspora refugees. [In Lebanon] we have been through war, we 
have lost many lives, and suddenly we find ourselves naked, severed from 
our nation. Oslo struck against our hopes of return [to Palestine/Israel]. 
The blow was not only political and psychological, but had practical 
consequences as well. -Souheil Al-Natour (Edminster, 1999. pp. 1) 
While it could be argued that the problems in the area of the Palestine Mandate 
can be traced back to the early foundations of Zionism or the opportunities presented by 
Ottoman Land Reform in the Middle 19th century, this study concerns itself with the 
origins of the actual large scale physical displacements of population beginning in 1947. 
It is necessary to examine the historical foundations of the conflict to be able to discuss 
the proposed solutions while recalling accepted international standards of conduct as 
defined by such documents as the Geneva Conventions and the United Nations Charter 
and subsequent resolutions. Once the issues of causation and international law are 
established, this chapter will deal with how the United Nations has involved itself in the 
issue of Palestinian refugees, and will conclude by describing the status of the various 
Palestinian refugee communities under UN mandate. 
A. PROBLEMS WITH HISTORY 
By the conclusion of the first Arab-Israeli War, approximately 760,000 Arabs had 
departed the land that was to become the State of Israel, leaving behind only about 
160,000 of their kind (Morris, 1987. pp.298). Since then, there have been countless 
debates as to who or what made them flee. The primary argument from the Jewish side 
has been that the Arabs abandoned the land willingly under orders broadcast from the 
governments of the invading Arab Armies to make way for their tanks and troops. This 
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was allegedly done with the intention of returning to the land once the Jewish forces were 
destroyed. The Arab version of the Palestinian flight however, has always been that the 
armed forces of the Israelis, both pre- and post-statehood, employed broad ethnic 
cleansing tactics to push the Arabs off of the land to provide room and demographic 
stability to the new state and its stream of immigrants (Arzt, 1997. pp. 15) 
Such debate is not for the sake of moral righteousness; rather it plays a crucial 
role in determining culpability in the creation of, and thus responsibility for, the entire 
refugee problem (Dowty, 2001. pp. 1) Though it may seem trite in some respects, at its 
basic level, culpability in international law rests largely on the principle of "who started 
it?" When politicians and academics throw around such phrases as the "Right of 
Return," or the "Right to Compensation," taken from the text of UN Resolution 194, it is 
important to understand to what they are referring and why they believe it is justified 
based on the actions of the parties involved. 
Because of this, it is essential to determine how the Palestinians came to be 
refugees, and the legality or lack thereof, of the causal actions. The 1945 Nuremberg 
Charter made Mass Deportation a crime against humanity and the subsequent Geneva 
Convention of 1949 relating to the treatment of civilian populations in time of war 
explicitly outlawed forcible transfers, or mass expulsions of any kind. (Arzt, 1997. pp. 
67) 
Due to the work of such Israeli revisionist scholars as Benny Morris, and his 
examining of declassified Israeli documents from the conflict, we now know that the 
truth of the refugees' departure lies closer to the Arab telling. Take for example the 
writings of Joseph Weitz, the director of the Jewish National Fund's Lands Department: 
18 
It must be clear that there is no room in the country for both peoples.. .If 
the Arabs leave it, the land will become wide and spacious for us.. .There 
is no way but to transfer the Arabs from here to the neighboring countries, 
to transfer all of them, save perhaps for Bethlehem, Nazareth, and old 
Jerusalem. Not one village must be left, not one [Bedouin] tribe.. .and 
only after this transfer will the country be able to absorb millions of our 
brothers and the Jewish problem will cease to exist. There is no other 
solution. (Morris, 1987. p. 27) 
Weitz was writing in 1940, before the outbreak of hostilities in Palestine and his words 
are symptomatic of the attitudes of leading Israeli intellectuals. What is far more 
damning to the Israeli governments' claims of innocence than the mere writings of a 
government official is the very fabric of Israel's Plan D (Tochnit Dalei), undertaken on 
the eve of the 1948 War. 
The contents of Plan D and its objectives have become one of the most 
controversial topics enmeshed in the fabric of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and have only 
recently been made public and deciphered by scholars such as Morris. Plan D was 
disseminated to the Officers of the Haganah2 in early March of 1948, and was the Jewish 
plan to provide for the security of the state following the Arab invasion which was widely 
expected once the British completed their withdrawal in mid-May. The plan in its most 
basic sense, provided for the depopulation and destruction of Arab villages that "resisted" 
the Haganah, or that the Haganah could not effectively garrison, so as to eliminate 
sources of enemy fifth column activity. Morris states that "[Plan D] constituted a 
strategic-ideological anchor and basis for expulsions, by front, district, brigade and 
battalion commanders," and that "from the beginning of April, there are clear traces of an 
expulsion policy on both national and local levels with respect to certain key districts and 
localities" (Morris, 1987. p. 62). 
" The Haganah were the forerunners of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). 
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Moiris concludes, much to the bewilderment of many of his readers, that there is 
no clear evidence of a nationally directed policy of expulsion of Arab residents, and that 
those expulsions that did take place were the actions of individual commanders. Whether 
or not one believes that the young Jewish state had a formal policy of expulsion, it is 
indisputable that Plan D, which was promulgated from the Israeli National Authorities, 
set an overtly permissive tone for the large-scale expulsions of Arab civilians between 
December of 1947 and September 1949. Perhaps more telling is the fact that when it was 
clearly known such expulsions were taking place, no orders were given to reprimand the 
commanders or cease population transfers. The result of the war was that only one 
prewar Arab resident out of seven remained in the area of Palestine. 
B. THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE REFUGEES 
Even armed with these facts, many people question whether there is such a 
fundamental international right as the right of return as applied to the Palestinian 
refugees. The debate itself revolves around semantics. The notion of the right of return 
is based on the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights," passed by the United Nations 
in December, 1948 which contains within it the phrase, "Everyone has the right to leave 
any country, including his own, and to return to that country." This seems basic enough, 
but problems arise from two notions: First, the subject declaration was speaking about 
citizens of a nation. Since Palestine was never a country, according to critics of a return 
policy, the principle does not apply. Secondly, it is not clear if the law applies to 
descendants of the original refugees who may never have stepped foot inside the original 
land. So the right of return debate comes down to whether individuals from a country 
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that did not formally exist, together with their descendants born abroad, have a 
fundamental right to return to their original land from which they were wrongfully 
displaced. (Arzt, 1997. p. 64) 
This again relies on a basic tenet of international law, that if the expulsion from 
the land was illegal, the right to return to that land to reverse the illegal act is generally 
considered irrefutable. International law requires treaties be interpreted in a fundamental 
humanistic sense, rather than a strict technical manner (Arzt, 1997. pp. 64-65). This 
notion as regards the Palestinians became official by the United Nations in 1948. Acting 
on the recommendations and observations of UN Observer Count Folke Bernadotte, the 
United Nations passed Resolution 194 (III) on December 11th, 1948. The pertinent 
paragraph reads: 
[The UN] Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and 
live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the 
earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the 
property of those choosing not to return and for loss or damage to property 
which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made 
good by the governments or authorities responsible...3 
One of the factors that has made the Palestinian case unique is that with most refugees the 
United Nations has dealt with, the refugees themselves cannot and do not want to return 
to the country of origin, particularly while the conditions that made them refugees still 
exist (Hammarberg, 2001. p. 7). In this situation however, it was the desire to return and 
the steadfast belief that it would one day happen that has served to unite and define the 
very people displaced. 
3
 Text directly from UN General Assembly Resolution 194 (III), passed 11 December 1948, paragraph 11. 
This passage was inspired by the words of Count Bernadotte who was assassinated by Jewish terrorists two 
months before the Resolutions was passed. 
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Because of the "special nature" of the Palestinian Refugees, they do not fall under 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), but rather the United 
Nations Relief Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). 
Under UNRWA, the definition of who is a Palestinian Refugee is very specific, and 
differs from the normal international definition. UNRWA considers as a Palestinian 
Refugee, "any person whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 
June 1945 to 15 May 1948 and who lost both his home and his means of livelihood as a 
result of the 1948 conflict" (UN doc 7/83, Jan. 1984). As the definition of the UNRWA 
mandate is very specific, so is the area of responsibility. Included in UNRWA services 
are only those registered Palestinian refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank, 
and the Gaza Strip. 
Herein lies one of the most difficult factors in researching the Palestinian refugee 
issue-numbers. Every organization seems to have its own numbers that it uses for 
estimating populations. For example, Table 2 below, from a paper written by Elia Zureik 
for the Institute for Palestine Studies, gives some idea of how big the differences can be: 
Table 2 

















































Further complicating the issue, organizational bias may also play a part in the 
estimation of numbers. For instance, while the UNRWA figures for Lebanon today cite 
just over 370,000 refugees, the PLO puts the number at a low of 150,000 and in 
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diplomatic circles it is generally accepted to be between 180,000 and 200,000 
(Hammarberg, 2001. p. 8). In the interests of consistency, this paper will utilize the 
numbers of registered camps and refugees as determined by UNRWA, as well as 
scholars' estimates for groups of Palestinians residing in countries outside of the 
mandate. Included in the numbers outside of UNRWA are those Palestinians counted as 
present absentee by the Israeli State that still reside within the borders of Israel, together 
with those living in "unrecognized villages" within the State.4 Furthermore, refugees 
from the 1967 war that fled to Jordan are counted as "displaced persons" since at the time 
of the War, the West Bank was Jordanian territory and thus those who fled there are not 
considered refugees, as they did not cross international borders. However, the 
approximately one third of those fleeing, that were fleeing for the second time (after 
having taken refuge in the West Bank after 1948), are included in UNRWA's figures. 
What is certain today is that the approximately 800,000 refugees that fled in 1948 
have grown into 3,246,044 refugees registered with UNRWA as of 1996, which means 
that about half of the world's population of Palestinians are refugees. They are 
distributed throughout the world and in camps administered by UNRWA as shown in 
Table 3 below. As one might expect, the refugee populations in each of these States face 
unique difficulties since each host country has taken a slightly different approach to 
Any person was declared an absentee if he was, on or after 29 November, 1947 a citizen or subject of any 
of the Arab states; in any of these states for any length of time or in any part of Palestine outside of the 
Israeli controlled area, or in any place other than his habitual residence even if such place as well as his 
habitual abode were within Israeli-Occupied territory. In practice, even if the villager hid in a nearby 
orange grove while his village was seized he was declared an absentee and lost all rights to the land. 
(Zureik, P. 10) Also, the "unrecognized villages" today number about 40 villages with a total 50,000 - 
60,000residents which are not acknowledged by the State of Israel and receive no roads, water, sewage, 
electricity or schools. Their residents are not even acknowledged on census reports. Prince-Gibson, Eatta. 
2001. p. 1). 
23 
dealing with the Palestinians. Table 3 illustrates the differential status faced by the 
different populations. 
Table 3 
















West Bank 1,200,000 524,000 133,886 7,500 (E.Jerusalam) 11% N/A 
Gaza 880,000 700,789 389,035 Stateless 44% N/A 
Jordan 1,832,000 1,328,768 256,977 1,762,812 14% 696,340 
Lebanon 372,700 349,773 186,006 30,000 (mostly Christian) 50% Unknown 
Syria 352,100 342, 507 96,447 3,452 27% 17,500 + 
Descendants 
Israel 840,000 N/A N/A 840,000 N/A N/A 
Other Middle 
East 446,600 N/A N/A 
Mostly 
Stateless N/A Unknown 
Non-Middle 
East 452,400 N/A N/A Unknown N/A Unknown 
Total 6,375,800 3,246,044 1,061,351    | 2,643,764 plus? 17% 713,840 plus?   | 
C. STATUS OF REFUGEES WITHIN UNRWA STATES 
1.       Lebanon 
The population of registered Palestinian refugees within the territory of Lebanon 
is neither the largest nor the smallest of the UNRWA areas, but it is the poorest and has 
long been the target of official discrimination from the Lebanese Government. After 17 
years of Civil War and Israeli invasion to expel the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO), the government resolutely opposes any measures that would grant citizenship to 
refugees or give the camps a feeling of permanence. Due to the arrangement of the 
government ministries along religious lines based on a delicate population balance, the 
Lebanese claim that the mostly Sunni Muslim population of refugees would comprise 
10% of the overall population and would upset the country's, system too greatly and 
destroy the peace that has finally been established. (Edminster, 1999. pp. 1-2) 
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Since peace was established in the early 1990s, Lebanon has taken steps to 
formalize their dissatisfaction with the continued Palestinian presence. Government 
ministers have gone so far as to state, "Lebanon's refusal of (Palestinian) settlement is a 
condition of our existence" (from Sayigh, 2000. p. 2). Furthermore, Lebanon's 
constitution explicitly forbids permanent settlement of Palestinians within Lebanon and a 
series of harsh laws were passed shortly thereafter, prohibiting refugees from practicing 
technical professions or attending Government schools. This has resulted in 
unemployment rates in 1999 of 40% for Palestinian refugees overall in Lebanon and 60% 
for those who reside in Camps. The refugees do not have access to government- 
sponsored public health care as well as a wide range of other social services. 
(USCR/Leb,2001. pp. 2-3) 
Because of this legalized discrimination, the refugees have traditionally received 
the bulk of their services and support within the camps from the UNRWA and the PLO. 
Since the PLO's funding debacle following the withdrawal of support by key contributors 
resulting from Arafat's pro-Iraqi position in the Gulf War, the PLO money has all but 
disappeared, leaving the majority of the funding to UNRWA at a time of flagging 
international support for their operations (USCR/Leb, 2001. pp. 4-5). Without adjusting 
for inflation, UNRWA expenditures per refugee dropped by over 28% between 1992 and 
1997 (Edminster, 1999. p. 17). As of last year, the UNRWA no longer had the funds to 
assist special hardship cases (the very poorest of the refugees) repair their homes (Sayigh, 
2000. p. 2). This has resulted in high levels of poverty and a complete reversal of 
educational trends that up until 1975 had placed the Palestinians in Lebanon among the 
best educated people in the Arab world. 
25 
Much of the poverty in the camps is a result of warfare, which raged throughout 
the area for nearly two decades. Thousands of Lebanese families are without a male head 
of the household and thus a chief breadwinner. The homes destroyed either directly 
through fighting or via the rebuilding and revitalization efforts of the government for its 
Lebanese citizens cannot be rebuilt. Because several former camps and large portions of 
existing camps were destroyed during the war years and cannot be rebuilt, the population 
of refugees in the camps is actually living on less land than they did in 1948 despite a 
threefold increase of population. Because of this, housing in the Lebanese camps is the 
poorest of all of the UNRWA areas with an average density of almost five people per 
room and an average area of 80 square meters of living space per household. (Zureik, 
1996. p. 32) 
Lebanon's UNRWA camps have often become battlegrounds between rival 
Palestinian factions. The greatest rivalry has been between Syrian backed groups and 
Arafat's Fatah faction, which has been trying to establish control over the camps to 
increase the bargaining power of the PA (USCR/Leb, 2001. p. 1). In trying to establish 
control of camps such as Lebanon's largest, Ain El-Hilweh, Fatah met its strongest 
opposition from Islamist groups, which will be critical again later when this study begins 
to examine the susceptibility of camp residents to radicalization along religious lines. 
It has been made quite clear by the Government of Lebanon that naturalization of 
Palestinian refugees is not an option, though surveys of the camps, not surprisingly, show 
very few refugees desiring to stay in Lebanon even if they were granted full citizenship 
(Arzt, 1997. P. 47). However, a further problem arises from proposals to resettle these 
refugees in the new Palestinian State as well. Why would a refugee in Lebanon, who 
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most likely originated in the Galilee, have any interest in living in West Bank or Gaza? 
Moving there would move him further from his former home than he is in Lebanon. He 
would have little expectation of a job or adequate housing because of a lack of any 
connection to the area, which operates largely on a social corporatist structure. Because 
of this, it would appear that the only return option that would satisfy the demands of the 
refugee population in Lebanon is settlement within Israel itself. 
2.        Syria 
Information on Syrian refugees is somewhat more difficult to come by than for 
other regions under UNRWA due to state restrictions, press censorship, and fear of state 
intelligence agencies. Nonetheless, it is certain that the refugee population of Syria, 
while lacking citizenship, is well integrated into the national economy. Most Syrian 
camps are concentrated in the greater Damascus region and are not nearly as 
differentiated from the surrounding housing and populations as is the norm in the other 
regions. Officially, Syria treats Palestinian refugees as being like: 
Syrians by origin in Syria, in all matters pertaining to.. .the rights of 
employment, work, commerce and national obligations and by keeping 
their nationality of origin (Law 260, July 10th, 1956). 
Educational opportunities are available in government schools and universities, though 
those living in camps still receive their education through UNRWA schools, which are 
extremely overcrowded and operate on double shifts (USCR/Syr, 2001. p. 2).5 
While wages are still generally below those of Syrian citizens, Palestinians 
showed a greater emphasis on education and family planning, and nearly 70% own their 
own homes (Zureik, 1996. p. 34). Nonetheless, much of the labor done by refugee 
According to USCR, 93% of the camp schools operate at double shifts which is the highest percentage for 
any of the UNRWA administered areas. 
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workers in Syria is done without contracts and is performed entirely with the employers' 
tools, making it very easy for employers to dismiss workers at a whim thus promoting an 
inability of refugees to plan for the future. Due to a lack of faith in the peace process and 
a relatively decent life in Syria when compared to Palestinians in the other regions, to 
include the PA, there is little expectation that many of the Palestinian refugees, 
particularly the non-camp population, would resettle in the PA if the offer were made. 
Because of the relatively high level of integration of the population already, I believe that 
Syria is well suited to extend citizenship to Palestinian residents choosing to remain and 
accepting reparations at the conclusion of the peace process. 
3.        Jordan 
Almost 40% of Palestinian refugees live in Jordan where they comprise a clear 
majority of the population, which certainly makes their situation different from most 
refugee cases. Most Palestinians within Jordan hold Jordanian citizenship because of the 
1954 Nationality Law (Arzt, 1997. p. 44).6 This allows them full citizenship rights like 
regular Transjordanians, in that they can participate fully in politics and avail themselves 
of government services and educational institutions. Citizenship does not terminate their 
refugee status as determined by UNRWA, since according to that organizations mandate, 
the only things that can terminate their refugee status is a return to their homes or 
compensation for their losses. Even so, over 250,000 still reside in refugee camps with 
many of the same problems as camp residents in other countries. Unlike any of the other 
Most Palestinians without citizenship are those that came from the Gaza Strip in 1967 and then- 
descendants. Since Gaza was not Jordanian territory they are denied Jordanian citizenship and require 
official permission to work, and then must restrict this work to the private sector. 
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refugee sites, in Jordan the host country government by far pays the largest portion of the 
bill for supporting the camps (USCR/Jor, 2001. p. 3).7 
Nonetheless, while Palestinians are free to participate fully in Jordanian life, there 
is a clear yet unofficial dividing line that differentiates them from the Transjordanians 
whose country they share. Transjordanians are disproportionately represented in the 
public sector, to include the military, while the same can be said for the Palestinians in 
the private sector. Though they comprise a majority of the population, as of 1999 
Palestinians only held seven of 24 cabinet posts, seven of 40 Senate seats, and 11 of the 
80 members of the lower house of parliament (USCR/Jor, 2001. p. 2). Moreover, they 
are seen as a threat to the Hashemite throne, due in no small part to their activities 
following the 1967 war that eventually led to the "Black September" events of 1970 in 
which King Hussein forcibly expelled the PLO and its sympathizers from Jordanian soil. 
Which brings up another interesting point regarding their citizenship: it was granted to 
them with the expressed understanding that it in no way nullified their right to return or 
receive compensation in keeping with UN Resolution 194 (III) of 1948. 
If a right of return were granted in peace negotiations, it is uncertain how many of 
the refugees in Jordan would choose to exercise that right. There are those that consider 
themselves "Palestinian-Jordanians," and those that are "Palestinians temporarily living 
in Jordan" until they can return home. In her research, Laurie Brand placed Palestinians 
in four different groupings within Jordan, each of which affected the desire of the Group 
members to return: (Arzt, 1997. p. 45) 
During the 1998-99 reporting year, the Jordanian government spent $323 million dollars on behalf of 
Palestinian refugees and displaced persons, which was four times the UNRWA operating budget. 
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1. Refugee camp dwellers that have built up a greater identity as Palestinians vice 
Jordanians, due largely to their history of opposition to policies of the 
government. 
2. The petite bourgeoisie, which have expressed loyalty to the King and 
attachment to the State due to their improved status. 
3. The notables of the upper middle class who have achieved success and see no 
conflict whatsoever between being a Jordanian and a Palestinian. 
4. Those workers expelled from the Gulf States following the Gulf War who 
view their Jordanian passports and citizenship as a travel convenience and have 
no attachment to the State. 
Essentially, from this view, only those camp dwellers that have little investment 
in the State and nothing to keep them in Jordan could be expected to seek resettlement in 
the West Bank. 
4.        West Bank and Gaza Strip 
Unlike certain of the other areas administered by UNRWA, the Palestinian 
refugees of the West Bank and Gaza have been extensively studied and researched, 
resulting in an abundance of information about their living conditions and psychological 
state. According to 1999 UNRWA counts, the two territories together contained 
1,368,100 registered refugees (USCR/Gaz,2001. p. 1). Due to high birthrates, the 
population is growing at an annual rate of 4%, which puts it among the very highest in 
the world. The median age within the territories is 16.4 years, which means that for the 
vast majority of the population, they have known nothing but military occupation their 
entire lives and fully half of the population were just learning to walk and talk as the first 
intifadah got underway. (World Bank, 2000. p. 90) The fact that most Palestinian 
refugees within the West Bank and Gaza have from birth witnessed almost daily 
confrontation with military authorities has resulted in a corresponding breakdown in the 
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family structure as authority of elders has been seriously degraded and respect towards 
positions of authority such as teachers and community leaders is waning (Zureik, 1996. 
p. 39). 
Housing in the two areas varies, with infrastructure development considered very 
good for a developing area. Overcrowding, defined by international standards as more 
than three people per room, affects about 28% of refugee households (Zureik, 1996. p. 
37). A complete lack of open land in the camps caused by the overcrowding means that 
there are no places for children to play, which drives them into the street with the 
resultant problems of increased turf wars and drug abuse (Farah, 2000. p. 10). 
Simultaneously, there is pressure on the residents from an unemployment rate in the 
territories of around 40% during times of closure, with higher rates in Gaza than in the 
West Bank (Zureik, 1996. p. 40). Combine these effects with a complete lack of 
privacy for residents and constant friction with family and neighbors due to close 
quarters, and it is easy to see why a general sense of depression pervades the narrow 
alleyways. 
What is perhaps surprising when considering the numbers of refugees in each area 
and the sheer density of humanity resulting is the revelation that the poorest and most 
psychologically damaged refugee communities are in the West Bank (Zureik, 1996. p. 
37).8 This is surprising because, on average, it is much more likely for a West Bank 
refugee to have sewage and electricity than his counterpart in Gaza, but it appears that 
Gazans have a much stronger sense of collective identity and purpose, and seem to have 
adapted better to the conditions under which they live. 
However, it must be said that the West Bank also contains the most successful refugee communities in the 
area of East Jerusalem. 
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Regardless of whether the area is controlled by the PA of the Israelis, the living 
conditions over the last six years throughout the West Bank and Gaza have been made 
more difficult by the dividing up of the region in cantonments which seek to preserve the 
integrity of Israeli settlements and the lines of communication between them. It seems 
clear that the system currently in place between the PA and Israel is not a permanent 
solution as it does not allow normal daily social and economic activity to occur for 
residents of the territories, refugee or not. Closure of the territories resulting from the Al- 
Aqsa Intifada of 2000 until the present, with its resulting near collapse of the PA 
economy, is symptomatic of the extreme political and economic leverage held by Israel 
over the residents of the West bank and Gaza. 
The current situation existing in the territories and the resultant lack of faith that 
the conflict can really be resolved has resulted in a situation where return to a Palestinian 
State within the occupied territories does not present an attractive solution to many 
refugees in the Diaspora. It is therefore necessary to examine the various solutions that 
have been put forward to solve the refugee problem and evaluate them to determine 
which presents the most likely resolution. 
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IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE REFUGEE PROBLEM 
A. RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT 
From the outset, it must be understood that Israel will not accept the return of a 
sizable portion of the Palestinian refugees to its soil. Since its inception, the state has 
been plagued by the difficult political choice of whether it is to be a Jewish state, or a 
Democracy. If it were a true democracy, such an influx of Palestinian Muslims to Israel 
proper would almost surely result in the loss of the Jewish character of the state. For the 
same reason, it could hardly claim to be a modern Western nation if it actively suppressed 
a major portion of its population. The solution for years has simply been to not allow any 
large numbers of Arabs to reside in the state. 
Israel's most consistent claim to date regarding the denial of the right of return is 
the states' lack of moral responsibility in creating the refugee crisis and the opinion that a 
de facto population transfer occurred in the 1950s with the flight of several hundred 
thousand Jews from Arab countries to Israel. Israel insists that since they integrated the 
Jews that fled the Arabs, so the Arab countries should integrate the Arabs that fled Israel. 
(Brynen, 1996. p. 1) 
A variety of academics and government representatives have expressed differing 
views of what is meant by UN Resolution 194 (III), but from their writings it is possible 
to develop a sense of what Israel may be willing to allow and what the Palestinians will 
be forced to accept. Since Israel is without a doubt the strongest party to this conflict, 
any realistic solution must conform to its requirements first, since as the stronger state, it 
has little concrete reasons for making compromise. Furthermore, any compromise made 
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by Israel may be viewed by its citizenry as betrayal or forfeiture of Jewish and state 
interests. 
If refugees choose to return, where would they go? A likely proposal is one 
where Israel recognizes the right to return in principle and allows approximately 75,000 
refugees to reside in Israel proper with Israeli citizenship. In response, the PA would 
recognize that the right of return for the majority of Palestinians could only be exercised 
within the PA. Who will decide how many Palestinians are really allowed to return to the 
areas of the PA? Shall the Israelis decide? They do not seem to have a stake in an 
overcrowded neighbor with widespread poverty staring out at the prosperity of Israel. If 
the PA were a sovereign state, it would be able to set its own limits and standards on 
immigration, which is a prime reason why Israel does not favor the establishment of a 
truly sovereign Palestinian Authority. 
Again, in what seems to be one of the more popular solutions to date, it has been 
made clear that the Government of Israel is not likely to extend the right of return to more 
than 75,000 Palestinian refugees. This would occur under a continuation of the Israeli 
family reunification program. This will largely be contingent upon the surrounding Arab 
States extension of citizenship to a portion of the refugees living within their borders 
(Arzt, 1997. p. 89). Concurrently, large numbers of refugees would be allowed to return 
to the areas of the PA, fulfilling at least some of the spirit of Resolution 194(111) by 
allowing the Palestinians to return to their national soil vice their prel948 homes within 
Israel (Brynen, 1996. p. 1). 
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Supporters of such actions, such as International Law expert Donna Arzt, envision 
a distribution of Palestinian refugees by 2005 (perhaps farther out now, due to events 
since September, 2000) as shown in Table 4: 
Table 4 
Repatriation and Resettlement of Palestinian Refugees. From Arzt, 1997. p. 88. 
1996 Populations 2005 Populations 
West Bank 1,200,000 2,400,000 
Gaza 880,000 450,000 
Jordan 1,832,000 2,000,000 
Lebanon 372,700 75,000 





Other Middle East states 446,600 965,000 
Non-Middle East states 452,000 900,000 
TOTAL 6,375,800 8,265,000 
Her projections allow for population growth and transfers of population as outlines 
above. However, what is striking about this proposed solution is where the population 
actually goes. The number of Palestinians in the Diaspora, even beyond the UNRWA 
areas, increases by approximately 1 million people. While just over 350,000 people are 
allowed to return to the West Bank and 75,000 are allowed to return to Israel, the Gaza 
Strip would lose almost two-thirds of its population, which would be sent abroad. 
Therefore, while conditions within the Gaza Strip might improve, the number of 
Palestinians living within the PA and Israel would actually decrease with this model. In 
addition, the criteria for being allowed back in to Israel as part of the 75,000 should not 
be taken too lightly. To qualify, an individual must: 
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1. Be able to prove original residence prior to 1948. 
2. Must have close family members (term yet to be defined) who have 
been citizens of Israel since 1948. 
3. They must agree in writing, to abide by Res. 194(111) "live at peace 
with their [Israeli] neighbors." Israel would retain the right to veto any 
returnee that they feel would not comply with this requirement 
(Arzt, 1997. p. 91) 
Again, the solution is not nearly as attractive as it may appear. 
B. COMPENSATION AND REPARATIONS 
Compensation and Reparations are difficult issues that have as many supporters 
and detractors as the issue of return (Brynen, 1996. p. 4). Supporters of the refugees 
point to Resolution 194(111) and its specific direction that compensation be paid out to 
refugees for the loss of physical property caused by the 1948 War, and insist additional 
reparations be paid for the physical suffering and loss of property endured by the refugees 
due to the war and their years of displacement. The attempt to accurately tabulate the 
monetary loss suffered by the refugees over the course of fifty years could be simply 
staggering to calculate on an individual basis. Partly because of this, it has been 
proposed by several parties to the discussion that a flat arbitrary payment ranging from 
$10,000 to $20,000, be paid to each refugee for their loss and hardship, to be paid from 
an international aid fund (Zureik, 1996. p. 65). 
As with nearly all facets of this conflict, what appears to be a straightforward 
resolution of the situation whereby the refugees elect to either return to Palestine, or 
accept monetary compensation/reparations and remain where they are with the 
citizenship of their host country, is anything but straightforward. To begin with, the task 
of determining the loss of the Palestinian refugees is not such a monumental task, as the 
United Nations Refugee Office completed it back in 1951. 
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The Refugee Office, utilizing land titles and village records for the years 
preceding the war, determined that of the total state area of post-war 1948 Israel of 
20,500,000 dunums (4 dunums = 1 acre), 16,324,000 of them were identified as refugee 
property. Over the course of the next ten years, the study detailed the individual holdings 
of Palestinian Arabs, identifying 1,500,000 holdings that had been lost, for a revised total 
of 17,500,000 dunums. The work of claims identification has therefore been done in 
great detail. The more realistic difficulty arises from the fact that payment of 
compensation indicates admission by the payer that a wrongful act was committed for 
which they are responsible, which is something that Israel is not willing to do. (Rempel, 
1999. pp. 38-39) 
The issue of who would get paid the money earmarked for the refugees is another 
potentially explosive element of the compensation regime as it is quite possible that the 
refugees would receive very little of any money paid. There are essentially four different 
ways in which compensation funds could be paid out. First, the most basic method of 
determining who receives the money is to quite cleanly pay all of the registered refugees 
and their descendants directly, with all of them receiving a set amount with a possible 
differentiation based on whether they were receiving compensation for losses and 
reparations, or simply reparations. A second option is to determine the amount received 
by whether or not the refugees choose to exercise the right of return, thereby enticing the 
most poor of refugees to remain in the Diaspora. The third method of payment would 
assign a large portion of the compensation/reparations package to the PA itself to assist in 
the absorption of the incoming population and the rehabilitation of the PA territories. 
Finally, it is almost certain that the current host governments, which have in some cases 
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spent huge sums of money supporting the refugees over the last 50 years, would make 
claims for restitution and costs in absorbing those Palestinians choosing not to exercise 
the right of return. Certainly, if the refugee issue is declared resolved without the 
refugees receiving more than a pittance in compensation, or nothing at all, because of 
direct government payments on their behalf, it would certainly strike a negative chord 
with the Palestinian camp populations. (Brynen, 1996, pp. 4-5) 
An ironic precedent in this instance is the reparation paid out to the State of Israel 
as well as individual Holocaust survivors by the German government for their losses and 
suffering during World War II. Much of this money went to Israel to offset the costs of 
accepting so many refugees. Initial payments of nearly one billion dollars were paid out 
to Israel in the 1950s, and then survivors around the world received a monthly pension 
for the remainder of their lives. So far, the German Government has paid out over $50 
billion dollars to individuals and the Israeli State, and will likely pay $20 billion more by 
the year 2030 when the payments are scheduled to cease. (Wise, 1993. pp. 1-5) 
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V. ABILITY OF THE PA TO ABSORB REFUGEES 
A. TODAY'S ECONOMIC SITUATION 
There will be limits on immigration to the PA, regardless of who sets them, due in 
large part to the economic and infrastructure realities/limitations of the territories as 
currently arranged. The situation in the territories both demographically and 
economically as created under Oslo is an interesting one and serves to further call into 
question the absorptive capacity of the future Palestinian entity in relation to the refugees. 
As it stood in the summer of 2000, the unemployment rate for the area as a whole, both 
refugee and otherwise, was steady at 14% with approximately 125,000 Palestinians 
working as day laborers within Israel itself. Simply to continue to meet the employment 
demands of a growing population, 30,000 new jobs must be created each year for the PA. 
(World Bank, June 2000. p. 91.) 
This expansion of population causes a potential crisis for the PA in the very near 
future simply in terms of capital outlays. Palestinian budgets as they stand today do not 
allocate much money at all to the maintenance of facilities, which means that to simply 
maintain the status quo, they will have to increase their expenditures on such things as 
schools by 64% in real terms by 2010.9 Complicating the projection of such figures is the 
fact that UNRWA currently provides education and health care to the nearly one quarter 
of the population that are registered refugees. Were they to cease operations, which is a 
logical assumption once a separate Palestinian entity were declared, the PA would have 
to raise another $165 million dollars in today's money to merely duplicate their efforts. 
(World Bank, June 2000. pp. 91-95) 
Additionally, the World Bank study projects that the PA needs to construct fifty new schools per year 
over the next ten years just to keep pace with current enrollments. 
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The economy of the PA was showing signs of life before the outbreak of the 
recent troubles, and was on its way to improving the living conditions of the Palestinian 
people-to a point. From January 1999, to June 2000, GDP had risen 6.1% with a 
corresponding increase in working days per year over the same period (World Bank, 
Nov. 2000. p. 2.).    One of the potential danger signs however, is the extraordinary 
number of Palestinians who are on the government payroll, thus skewing unemployment 
figures. The 2000 budget for the PA devoted nearly 60% of the expenditures to pay 
salaries for the 16% of Palestinians employed in the Public Sector (World Bank, June 
2000. p. 88.).11 The creation of regime loyalty through the provision of government jobs 
via patronage networks is damaging to foreign investment prospects and makes the fiscal 
job of running the PA more difficult. 
B. EFFECTS OF CLOSURE OF PA AREAS 
Economic projections aside, it is the ability of the Israeli security forces to 
effectively shut down the territories through a series of checkpoints and roadblocks 
owing to the nature of the territorial arrangement that has been the biggest obstacle to 
viable statehood for the PA. Even when there is no closure, in order for a Palestinian to 
pass from the Gaza Strip into Israel, he must be married, over 30, and have a clean 
security record (Rabbani, 2000. p. 3.). Historically, during times of full closure of the 
West Bank and Gaza such as we see today, unemployment figures rise dramatically in 
both areas as the regular day laborers are unable to make the journey into Israel, as 
demonstrated in Table 5. 
10
 Assuming even that job creation did not continue at this rate (and that closures such as those that started 
in September, 2000 and that are ongoing did not happen) the PA economy was expected to grow at a 
sustained rate of 5.2% through 2001. 
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Table 5. 
Border Closures Imposed on the PA, 1993-2000. From UNSCO, Jan 2000. p. 4) 
Year 















1993 26 9 17 6.13% 
1994 89 25 64 23.1% 
1995 112 28.5 83.5 29.93% 
1996 121 31.5 89.5 31.91% 
1997 79 22 57 20.54% 
1998 26 11.5 14.5 5.21% 
1999 16 9 7 2.53% 
2000 75 23 52 18.81% 
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Complicating the matter further is the reality that as more and more Palestinians 
are out of jobs and making less money, the cost of goods rises dramatically due to 
increased transaction and transportation costs arising from the closure. Not only is it 
more difficult to get to work within Israel, it also becomes quite difficult to get to work 
within the territories themselves as all of the towns and cities are separated by Israeli 
checkpoints. Thus, not only does the area get hit by a 50% rise in transaction costs, the 
World Bank estimates that it also loses approximately 25% labor productivity because 
workers are held up at checkpoints and prevented from freely going to and from their 
workplace within the area. For instance, during the recent closures in Gaza, average 
travel time from Khan Yunis to Gaza City increased 341%, from 30 to 132 minutes with 
a corresponding increase in taxi fare of 111% (UNSCO, Jan. 2000. p. 4). 
Whatever economic recovery the West Bank and Gaza was experiencing before 
the recent violence has been erased by the full Israeli closures. In the first month of the 
current uprising, both UNSCO and the World Bank estimate the PA lost $210 Million US 
dollars in revenue. Given the present geographic situation in the territories, it will take a 
11
 Comparable figures of government employment for the Middle East show Egypt at 12%, Jordan and 
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significant amount of time before the Palestinians can recover economically, especially if 
Israel follows through with threats to hire foreign laborers to replace the Palestinians on a 
permanent basis. 
C. PROSPECTS FOR RECOVERY 
If Palestine is to recover, and the land that the PA occupies is roughly the same 
as it was when negotiations last broke down, the crucial issue becomes the manner in 
which the PA expects to make the recovery. By what industries will it raise revenues? 
What resources will it possess? How much autonomy will it have in trade matters? How 
can it incorporate large numbers of immigrants in a short time? All of these questions are 
important if any serious speculation about the future viability of a right of return to the 
PA is to occur. However, as all of these matters have been pushed back in negotiations 
until "final status" talks, speculation replaces facts, and from those speculations arise 
some general predictions as to what difficulties face the Palestinians in the near future. 
In any successful Palestinian economy, agriculture is likely to be the key 
component, with the population already in possession of the requisite skills and 
demonstrated abilities in this market. With current map configurations the way they are, 
only about 25% of the arable land in the Occupied Territories will revert to PA control 
(De Jong, 1998. p. 88). The rest has been appropriated over the years of occupation by 
the aforementioned absentee laws and outright military seizures. This was made quasi- 
legal through manipulation of Ottoman Land Law codes that placed land in several 
different categories of ownership, and left them ripe for exploitation by Israel (Shehadeh, 
1988. p. 34). 
Tunisia both at 10%. 
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Further hampering full Palestinian exploitation of the land available is poor access 
to water for irrigation and general use. While the PA contains a large amount of water by 
Middle East standards, over 80% of the fresh water in the West Bank flows from the 
West Bank directly to consumers inside Israel (PNA, 2000. p. 1). Most of this water 
comes from aquifers beneath the area, which Israel will control following transition. As 
for surface water, as much as 75% of the water in the Jordan River is diverted by Israel 
before it reaches the West Bank, depriving the residents of its irrigation capacity. There 
is some speculation that if dams could be constructed in the area of the Jordan valley, 
much of the floodwaters that annually flow through the area could be retained and used 
for agriculture, or that desalinization plants could be constructed in Gaza (Abdullah, 
1994. p. 131). However, the Oslo Accords do not allow the PA any authority to create or 
expand water sources by themselves, nor do they allow the PA any control of the Jordan 
Valley, which is to remain a security area. 
Another key item when attempting to gauge the economic capabilities of the PA 
as they relate to its absorptive capacity is one of trade and resultant trade restrictions. 
This becomes of prime concern when viewed against the noncontiguous nature of the 
land ceded to the PA. In the Palestinian view, this facet of relations with Israel is the 
most crucial, for the territories have benefited over the years as a sort of free trade zone 
with Israel. Without raw materials of their own, Palestinians rely on the importation of 
materials from abroad and then the exporting of these assembled products out of the 
territories. The single greatest resource possessed in the PA is manpower. As long as 
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Palestine can receive their resources and get them back out to market, they have the 
opportunity to grow industrially, but they will in a very large way be dependant on Israeli 
cooperation. 
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VI. PALESTINIAN IDENTITY 
In the beginning of this work, a framework was established that makes it possible 
to gauge certain characteristics of a particular ethnic group. Having established that 
framework and learned what the Palestinian history has been to the current day, this 
chapter will overlay the two to answer three questions: 1) Do the Palestinians constitute 
an ethnonationalist group, contrary to the assertions of Golda Meir? 2) How strong is 
their sense of identity? 3) What identity orientation are they most likely to pursue? 
A. DO PALESTINIANS CONSITUTE AN ETHNONATIONALIST GROUP? 
Using our listing of six factors essential to the formation of an ethnic identity 
established in the second chapter, the Palestinians, in a broad grouping, fit the construct 
in the following manner: 
1. A collective Proper name. The name Palestinian indicates an Arab resident of 
the area of The Palestine Mandate prior to the establishment of the State of Israel, and 
their descendants born abroad following the 1948 war. 
2. A myth of common ancestry. Ancestry of Palestinians is common as far as 
their being descended from the farmers, merchants and traders that lived in the area 
during the time of the Ottoman Empire. 
3. Shared historical ancestry. Clearly there is no element of Palestinian history 
more defining than the dispossession of their land in 1948 and again in 1967, and the 
resultant life in the Diaspora. 
4. One or more differentiating elements of common culture. In this case, that the 
common Arab linguistic and cultural bonds become subordinate to the common identity 
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forged in the refugee camps and the occupied territories. It is important also to recall that 
the label "Palestinian" encompasses more than simply Muslim Palestine, Christians are 
included as well. 
5. An association with a specific homeland. Palestine is associated with that 
portion of the Eastern Mediterranean shoreline, inland to the Jordan River, and South 
from Lebanon to the Southern borders of the Negev Desert. 
6. A sense of solidarity for a significant sector of the population. For those 
residents of the Occupied territories, the Intifada provided a common bond of struggle; 
likewise the populations of Jordan and Lebanon, whether it be the war of attrition from 
1967 to 1970 or the intercamp wars of the mid-1980s, have shared a common suffering 
and have come together because of it. 
On a collective scale, the Palestinians in the occupied territories and those in the 
UNRWA countries constitute an ethnonationalist movement, as they are regionally 
concentrated, reside across the borders of several different states, and are politically 
motivated toward gaining greater autonomy and self-rule. (Gurr/Harff, 1994. p. 18) 
The two dominant theoretical perspectives used in determining the motivations 
behind ethnonationalist activism are relative deprivation and group mobilization (Gurr, 
1993. p. 123). Relative depravation states that people such as the Palestinians become 
politically motivated due to resistance to ongoing discriminatory practices or unjust 
deprivation, while group mobilization views political mobilization as a calculated move 
by political elites to take advantage of a particular opportunity. Therefore, determining 
the motivation for the Palestinian ethnonationalist movement represented by the Palestine 
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Liberation Organization (PLO) becomes a question of legitimate grievances or political 
opportunism under the guise of groups' rights. 
In the case of the Palestinians, the movement for greater rights and autonomy 
symbolized by the majority of the PLO and by the masses in the street combating the IDF 
is the result of real grievances against the dominant powers. These are present in every 
country considered in this report, encompassing Hashemite favoritism of Trans Jordanians 
in the public sphere in Jordan, the work and housing restrictions placed on refugees by 
the Lebanese government, and the disparity of status between settlers and Arabs within 
the Occupied Territories; they are all based on status of varying ethnic groups. 
Palestinians could make a further case against the International Community for 
discrimination, as the enforcement of UN resolution 181 establishing the State of Israel is 
ensured, while Resolutions 194 (III) and 242/338 regarding the return of land to the 
Palestinians are left unfulfilled. 
When it comes to the question of the leadership of the PLO however, the answer 
for its rationale in accepting the Declaration of Principles (DoP) lies partly in both 
motivations. This is because the PLO senior leadership had long looked at the 
establishment of a two-state solution as a viable end to the conflict and an effective 
redress of discriminatory practices against their people, but that the timing and nature of 
the agreement seems to have been borne of political expediency. The decision in the 
summer of 1993 came at a low point politically and economically for the PLO following 
their disastrous decision to back Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War against their largest 
financial contributors, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. 
47 
B. STRENGTH OF IDENTITY 
Equally important as the underlying motivation for activism is the strength of 
group identity, since weak group cohesion is not sufficient to undertake or sustain 
collective action. Using the four criteria established early in Chapter II, it is possible to 
apply them to the Palestinian case to determine how important and how strong that ethnic 
identity is to those who possess it, whether it is personally chosen or imposed upon them 
from outsiders. 
In discussing collective disadvantage in the second chapter, it was stated that 
there are essentially three different categories relating to political or economic disfavor, 
cultural differentiation, or demographic/ecological stress. These differentiations are 
important to the Palestinians not only in how they view themselves, but how they are 
viewed by others. 
As has been shown in Chapter III, when it comes to political and economic 
discrimination, Palestinian refugees in all of the UNRWA areas have experienced at least 
one of these, and those in the territories and Lebanon have experienced exclusion in both 
spheres. Economically, Palestinians living in the territories were actually the target of 
deliberate de-development that sought to ensure the inability of the population to exist 
without Israeli support, which places them firmly on the high end of the scale used to 
measure economic discrimination. (Roy, 1995.) 
Furthermore, Palestinians have been disadvantaged based upon their real and 
perceived differences in cultural, racial or religious differences from the ruling group in 
each of the countries in which they reside, regardless of whether the government is Arab 
or Jewish. Combining the established historical discussion in Chapter III with the criteria 
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above, it is possible to make general statements about each of the UNRWA areas where 
Palestinians reside. In the Occupied Territories, the population differences are great, 
being based not only on religious and language differences, but commonly European vice 
Levantine cultural norms. In Lebanon, where politics is defined along sectarian lines, the 
Palestinians are set apart, but there are other Sunni Muslim and Christian groups 
operating in the country to lessen the divisiveness of this trait. Moreover, there are no 
language or racial barriers with Lebanon as there are within Israel and the Occupied 
Territories. Differentiations between Palestinians and host country nationals in Syria and 
Jordan are extremely minor as religion, language, and racial characteristics are the same, 
and they all share Levantine cultural norms. Nonetheless, in both places the Palestinian 
communities are identified as being separate from the greater population and are 
frequently treated as outsiders. 
Finally, demographic and ecological stresses combine to define the nature of this 
conflict, as it occurs in the Middle East where resource scarcity is a major issue. In the 
case of the refugee camps throughout all of the UNRWA areas, population density and 
building restrictions have resulted in dense communities of poorly constructed homes 
which often lack basic sanitation, setting these people apart from their non-refugee 
neighbors. 
Taken together, the subordinate elements that define the strength of an ethnic 
group's identity in the case of the Palestinians can be judged as very significant in terms 
of political, economic, and demographic/ecological differentiations. When it comes to 
cultural differentiation, the indicators are weak in Syria and Jordan, more significant in 
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Lebanon, and all encompassing in Israel and the Occupied Territories themselves where 
they define everything that happens throughout a person's life. 
Therefore, keeping in mind all three criteria being used, it can be said that in 
terms of strength of Palestinian identity,12 the five population areas in UNRWA can be 
ranked from highest to lowest in the following order: Lebanon, Gaza Strip, West Bank, 
Syria and Jordan. The inclusive nature of the regimes in Syria and Jordan serve to lessen 
the Group identity in those places and are consistent with studies that show less desire for 
return to Palestine among Syrian and Jordanian refugees, particularly those living outside 
the camps. 
Remember that the salience of group identity is the second factor contributing to 
the strength of an ethnic group, and attempts to measure how important the maintenance 
ofthat identity is to group members. Do the people living in the different UNRWA areas 
feel a kindred sense of struggle with their other group members whom they have never 
met? Do they view themselves as waging a common struggle? Commenting on the first 
Intifada, as reports of Israeli actions circulated through the outlying refugee communities 
in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, Don Peretz writes, "Such reports tend to exacerbate 
militant attitudes toward Israel, the UN, the United States, and even Arab governments, 
which appear to be unable to ameliorate the plight of those under Israeli rule"(Peretz, 
1993. p. 36). Indeed, the past actions by Israel for their role in causing the refugee 
problem, and the international community for allowing the injustice to continue, have left 
in the Palestinians a common notion that they must fend for themselves. 
This is further reinforced by a deep sense of betrayal on the part of many 
Palestinians regarding the actions of their fellow Arabs. It was bad enough that 
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Westerners and Jews were pushing the Palestinians off of their land, but the 
discrimination and marginalization they have often felt from the other Arab countries 
despite their statements of support have left a bitter taste in their mouths to say the least. 
Researcher Nels Johnson describes the apt analogy of the Palestinians being "Uthmän's 
Shirt" for the other Muslims. Referring to Uthmän, one of the first four "rightly guided" 
Caliphs, who was murdered. The analogy is explained as follows: 
We are only Uthmän's Shirt. After the Caliph Uthmän was murdered, 
leaders would say, 'I do this in the name of Uthmän' when they wanted 
people to believe them. But they only used his name. They waved his 
bloody shirt. Today, we Palestinians are Uthmän's shirt.. .(Johnson, 1983 
P. 60) 
Therefore, the issue of group identity is salient to the conflict not only across the cultural 
lines of Islam and Judaism or Arab and Jew, but between Arab and Palestinian. 
As demonstrated by the history of the PLO, Palestinians have had noteworthy 
success in energizing and sustaining resistance activities, which demonstrate a high level 
of group cohesion mobilizing ability. This supports the third pillar of identity strength by 
demonstrating that the identity and it's meaning is shared across camp boundaries. The 
only significant caveats to this cohesion are the Syrian influenced camps in Lebanon and 
organizations such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the territories, though it must be said 
that even these opposition groups are united in the desire to drive Israel out of the 
Occupied Territories—they differ largely in how far Israel should be pushed. 
The final element determining strength of identity concerns the amount of 
repression meted out by the dominant groups. As stated earlier, the Israelis clearly 
dominate every facet of life for ethnic Palestinians living within the territories. In 
Lebanon, Palestinian refugees are pawns in political games between Syria, Lebanon, and 
12
 Determined here as how much it intrudes in their daily lives. 
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Israel, and have essentially no freedom outside of the camps (Sayigh, 2000. p. 1). In 
Syria, refugees are a small portion of the national economy and are not necessarily any 
worse off than most other Syrian communities, though certainly it can be said that the 
Alawi minority dominates the political spectrum over everyone, not just the Palestinians. 
Likewise, in Jordan, while Palestinians form a majority of the population and are the 
largest share of its business community, they are consistently underrepresented in the 
government and military. 
The strong sense of ethnic identity in the Palestinian population is perhaps most 
important when viewed against the plans for resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
If a people have defined their very ethnic identity by a fifty-plus year struggle to regain 
their homeland, how likely are they to give it up and assimilate into the surrounding 
countries because leaders they never freely elected signed away their struggle for 
somebody else's definition of peace? Noted author and authority on Palestinian refugees 
in Lebanon, Rosemary Sayigh, feels that "post-settlement assimilation of the refugees 
might raise harder problems than did their post-Nakba [1948 war] reception" (Sayigh, 
2000. p. 3) 
C. PALESTINIAN IDENTITY ORIENTATIONS 
Using the set of identity orientations developed by Asaad Azzi and detailed in 
Chapter II, it is necessary to incorporate everything discussed to this point to determine 
the likely answers of the Palestinian populations to the simple "yes/no" questions 
proposed within his matrix. This is important to determine, as solutions to the refugee 
issue that call for resettlement and/or integration into states other than the PA or Israel 
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force states to deal very directly with populations that may choose to pursue any one of 
these four identities with obvious implications. 
It has been stated previously that a key determinant of assimilation is the degree 
of individual expression and decision making that is acceptable in a given society. How 
individualistic is the Palestinian society? Where do the different refugee populations fit 
into the assimilation mold? Truthfully, it is hard to come by specific research into the 
level of individualism possessed by an ethnic group; as a result, much of the following 
short discussion is based on cultural assumptions and survey data. In general, corporatist 
social structures like those of the Palestinians have not traditionally put a high value on 
individual freedoms. Furthermore, within the typical family structure of the Palestinian 
extended family, or hamula, it would not normally be permissible to make a decision that 
went against the general wishes of the family. However, there are many exceptions to 
this in Palestinian society, as evidenced by the plethora of political parties and 
movements, which would seem to show a willingness of individual Palestinians to split 
from the group (CPRS, Poll #48. p. 3).13 The generalization can be made that 
Palestinians, on average, Palestinians are not highly individualistic and would not be 
prone to a high level of assimilation, especially considering the nature of their 
dispossession. It is hard to imagine someone living apart from a host culture for 50 years 
as a refugee and then turning their back on the goal that sustained them by fully joining 
the larger culture. 
Data in this poll shows a wide variety of political parties and candidates supported across the spectrum of 
Palestinian society with no candidate or party having over 39% of the vote. This would seem to show a 
relatively high degree of political individualism, though it must be remembered that this data is for the 
West Bank and Gaza only. 
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In terms of Palestinian refugees, marginalization is the most likely outcome for 
those left to assimilate in Lebanon, as that country's government has stated very clearly 
that it has no place for them on a permanent basis (Sayigh, 2000. p. 3). Additionally, 
upon conclusion of a peace deal it can be assumed from past experiences that those 
former refugees sent abroad to work throughout the Middle East are likely to find 
themselves marginalized as third country nationals living in relative poverty. 
The two remaining types of Group identity to affect Palestinians are integration 
and separation, which are likely to be the two dominant forms to be adopted in the wake 
of a peace settlement. Integration is most likely in large sectors of the non-camp 
Palestinian refugee populations in Syria and Jordan, as people resign themselves to the 
fact that return to Palestine is simply not possible. 
Relations with the outgroups in those two countries have been positive on the 
whole, with the exception of the "Black September" events of 1970 in Jordan where the 
PLO was forcibly expelled. Since that time in Jordan, Palestinians have become the 
dominant economic group, and though they retain their Palestinian identity, they are well 
integrated into the larger Jordanian population (USCR/Jor, 2001. p. 1). Likewise in 
Syria, Palestinians are treated as citizens in all but name, and with the exception of some 
minor economic disadvantages, large portions of their populations are also already part of 
the greater Syrian economy. Thus in both Syria and Jordan, refugees living outside of the 
camps have managed to succeed in the greater culture, but in succeeding, they have set 
themselves apart from the outgroup by running the private sector in Jordan and attaining 
higher educational standards and lower birth rates than the host population in Syria. 
(Zureik, 1996. p. 34) 
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In the above section on integration, a distinction was maintained between those 
Palestinians living in the camps and those living on the outside in the host society for a 
reason. Whether a refugee has lived in the camps makes a very large difference in terms 
of who pursues separatist agendas. In his study of the refugees in the peace process, 
Peretz makes a major point about the strength of Palestinian consciousness within the 
camps, which is constantly reinforced by teachers, parents, and school administrators, 
many of whom have never been to Palestine. Militant attitudes prevail among the rapidly 
growing populations throughout the UNRWA camps, as each year a larger percentage of 
the population comes of age that has never known anything but the struggle of the 
Intifadas, whether seen in person in Ramallah or heard on the radio or TV in Beirut. This 
is reinforced on a regular basis by patriotic songs and slogans in camp schools flying the 
Palestinian flag, so that generations have come of age believing that it is their duty to 
struggle and free the homeland. (Peretz, 1993. p. 27) 
Refugees raised in such an environment are not likely to desire assimilation or 
integration, but with the limited numbers expected to receive approval to return to Israel 
and Palestine, many will be told to try. At this point, large segments of the young 
Palestinian population of former refugees will likely look for ways to carry on the 
struggle that "their" leadership abandoned, without extensive outside assistance. The 
main question then becomes mobilization to collective action for those refugees living 
outside of the occupied territories. 
D. INFLUENCE OF EFFICACY BELIEFS ON COLLECTIVE ACTION 
Efficacy beliefs form the cornerstone of mobilizing populations, or significant 
portions thereof, to collective action. As has been discussed previously, in Palestinian 
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society there is a strong corporatist social structure, resulting in a weak belief in 
individual self-efficacy. This is again why assimilation would not be expected to occur 
on a large scale among the refugee population. However, the mere belief that it is not 
acceptable to head out on your own is not sufficient to cause collective action. 
In the case of the Palestinian refugees, and indeed the larger Palestinian 
population, the strong cultural identity detailed in previous chapters plays directly into 
the requirements of group mobilization. In Chapter II it was discussed that collective and 
participatory self-efficacy beliefs play a crucial role in this process, as they minimize the 
fear that any particular Palestinian is going to be the only one in the street protesting. 
Furthermore, in any conflict, boundaries of one's community group are tightened and 
solidarity increases (Johnson, 1983. P. 93). As the conflict increases, the identity 
becomes stronger, which then brings about stronger conflict. This cycle of anger and 
violence is reinforced by the cultural indoctrination environment in the camps which 
Peretz describes, which is specifically tailored to bring about collective action, whether 
that action is to rebuild the community in historic Palestine or to defend its rights against 
the outgroup. In the Palestinian case, this cycle of violence reinforcing the cultural 
identity has been continually reinforced for over 50 years now. 
The plight of the refugee populations and their suffering is shared collectively 
across the community, but it is embodied on a personal level as well as inside each camp 
resident. Take for instance the words of Izzat, a young Palestinian man befriended by 
Norwegian researcher Dag Lonning, during the fall of 1996: 
.. .you know, you can't sit curled up like a baby with your arms 
over your head your entire life just taking humiliation after 
humiliation.. .There is no way I can accept not getting my state and my 
capital (Lonning, 1998. p. 177). 
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Clearly in this case, the young man had a strong sense of identity, believing in the 
Palestinian right to a state and a capital. He possesses a well-developed concept of 
discrimination by those outside his group and a belief that by his participating, perhaps 
those goals could be realized. 
E. MOBILIZATION UNDER AN ISLAMIC BANNER 
In the past there has never been much question as to who was calling the plays for 
the Palestinians; it was always pretty certain that Yasir Arafat and his Fatah party were 
responsible for it in some way. But since the start of the first Intifada in 1987 and 
continuing past the signing of the Oslo Accords, there has been a changing of the 
leadership role played by Fatah, and a greater legitimacy and impact by parties such as 
the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and Islamic Jihad.14 While such parties are, 
like Fatah, committed to the removal of Israel from the Occupied Territories, they are 
more concerned with the full removal of Israel itself. The following passage is taken 
from the charter of Hamas: 
The last hour would not come until the Muslims fight against the Jews and 
the Muslims would kill them, and until the Jews would hide themselves 
behind a stone or a tree and a stone or a tree would say: Muslim or servant 
of Allah, there is a Jew behind me; come and kill him. (Hamas charter, 
1988. p. 13) 
In the arena of Palestinian politics, it has always been the secular doctrine of the 
PLO and its dominant Fatah faction that have stood at the forefront of the struggle, yet 
over the years Islamic and secular terms have been so completely intertwined that they 
are commonly used today by both "secular" Muslims and Christian Palestinians 
(Johnson, 1983. P. 65). 
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That religion has never been far from the surface in the Palestinian conflict seems 
obvious, but until the first Intifada there were no real political parties or organizations 
with an expressed Islamist framework of political action in the Palestinian camp. 
Ironically, it was Israel that introduced the overtly Islamic parties to the front lines of the 
conflict by encouraging their opposition to the PLO and allowing them much greater 
latitude in demonstrations than the secularists were allowed under Arafat. By introducing 
a religious element into the territories that was also opposed to the PLO and its 
nationalists, the Israelis hoped to heighten their social control over Palestinian society by 
keeping it fragmented. (Robinson, 1997. p. 155) Instead they created a monster. 
Moreover, once it became an established part of the political landscape, Hamas 
reconciled its position in relation to the PLO by declaring that they were partners in the 
fight against Israel like "a son towards his father" (Hamas Charter, 1988. p. 34). 
Before discussing the role of Hamas in more detail, it is crucial to understand the 
ideology of Islamist movements and what constitutes their appeal to the Palestinians. By 
way of comparison, it is instructive to note that throughout much of the world a very high 
percentage of intellectuals plant their political and ideological foundations in either 
Marxism or Islamic Fundamentalism (Fischer, 1982. p. 113). In this sense, a more 
accurate term than Islamic Fundamentalists for these groups, is that of "Islamist," which 
denotes someone that sees in Islam a political ideology as much as a religion, a sort of 
romanticized return to a mythologized method of governance unseen since the infant days 
of Islam where 'justice and equality prevailed.' The Islamists seek above all, a unity of 
religious, legal, and political spheres (Roy, Olivier, 1994. p. 13). They do not seek a 
For the sake of simplicity and in deference to their dominating role in the Islamist movement I will 
heretofore simply refer to either "Hamas" or the "Islamists." 
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Palestine with Muslims in it, but rather a Palestine that is Muslim to its very core, in its 
structure, in its governance and in its adherence to Shari'a alone. 
Islamist movements worldwide are normally caused by little more than a reaction 
to a failure of the established order or the westernized systems of governance. It is a 
movement comprised primarily of three groups: An elite-comprised of businessmen and 
professionals (normally from the sciences); frustrated intellectuals or underemployed and 
unemployed college graduates; and a mass base of unemployed semi-educated youth. 
Usually, it is frustration arising from economic depravations and the feeling that the state 
has not followed through on its obligations to provide a job and a house commensurate 
with one's education and status, and overall frustration with the existing system that 
drives people to these movements. While this explains their historically high levels of 
education, some research suggests there is a trend towards a lowering of the education 
level which would be consistent with a broadening of their base of support among the 
less-educated youth as the "struggle" continues. (Richards, 1995. pp. 3-4) 
If there were such a thing as an "average" Islamist, it would be a young person 
with some education, most likely unemployed or underemployed, who has likely just 
undergone a large life change such as moving to the city. As stated by Ayubi: 
Theirs is a case of proverbial sour grapes: they hate modernity because 
they cannot get it! The Islamists are angry not because the aeroplane has 
replaced the camel; they are angry because they cannot get on the 
aeroplane (Ayubi, 1991. p. 177) 
It is important to understand the real meaning ofthat passage, as it highlights the point 
that the religious aspect of the Islamist movements is largely secondary. In an interview 
in the book After Oslo, one young Palestinian man who had always been non-religious, 
and who had established a long relationship with the researcher, demonstrated how easily 
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religion can step in and fill a void of hope in exactly the way the Islamists promise. 
When asked by the interviewer why he suddenly used Koranic verse to justify 
the Intifada, (not surprisingly, the same Koranic verse that the passage from the HAMAS 
charter above is based on) he replied: 
You're right, I am not religious, but I'm still Moslem, and I believe what 
is written in the Koran.. .The Arabs will unite, and once again become 
spiritually clean and militarily strong. God is just, and he will not sit and 
watch us being humiliated forever. (Lonning, 1998. p. 177) 
It is not necessarily a return to the mosque or to prayer that consumes the Islamists, but a 
desire to change the system and end the perceived injustice or humiliation. 
It should be easy to see by this point why movements such as Hamas represent a 
real draw to elements of the Palestinian population, particularly the refugees. Refugees 
frequently live in squalid housing. The people have just enough education to know that 
they want and deserve a better life, but not enough education to actually get it. They live 
in neighborhoods of high unemployment and crumbling infrastructure, with flat incomes 
and an ecologically deteriorating environment. They feel that the system has failed them: 
We have a little autonomous piece of land here, and a couple of other 
pieces there. We have no state, and if we ever get one, it will not be the 
one we fought for. Our leaders have become dictators, the democratic 
ideals of the Intifada are crushed. (Lonning, 1998. p. 173) 
Capitalizing on these perceptions of regime failure, the Islamists have abilities 
that the PA does not have, with which it can mobilize support. As the social services of 
the PA or the host states cease to function or function at a poor level due to lack of funds 
or a change in government priorities, the Islamists quickly fill the void with health care, 
day care, and schools that are often much better than those offered by the state (Richards, 
1995. p. 16). In the wake of the ongoing Al-Aqsa Intifada for instance, the Islamic 
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charity organization "Salah," believed to be tied to Hamas, distributes $5,000 to the 
spouse or parents of those killed in the fighting and $2,500 to the families of those that 
are wounded. This is in addition to 200,000 food baskets distributed by the same 
organization during the current troubles (Orme, 2001. p. 1). 
By providing such vital services, not only does Hamas mobilize support for its 
political goals, it also serves to eliminate the free rider problem by being able to deliver 
concrete benefits to its supporters, thus ensuring their political activity by tying it to 
receipt of benefits. The states are left with very little with which to counter these moves, 
and again the popularity of the Islamists rises. In a poll in the occupied territories taken 
last year, 75% of those Palestinians queried believed that Hamas and the other Islamist 
movements should be included in any PA government. Approximately 20% reported that 
they primarily identified themselves with an Islamist party, compared with only 35% 
supporting Arafat's Fatah. (CPRS, Poll #48. p. 2) As Said stated, "The emergence of 
Hamas and Islamic Jihad are part of the continuing protest and should be understood as 
that" (Said, 1996. p. 156). 
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VII. MAKING SENSE OF IT ALL 
A. PUSHING PEACE 
The story of the modern Palestinian people is not a simple one. While some have 
been able to find success in the Arab world and beyond, many have lived in squalor, in 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip under military occupation, or both. They have been the 
subject of many speeches and resolutions by the international community, and have 
looked to their Arab brethren for assistance in bringing about their return to Palestine-to 
little avail. Across much of the world, beyond simply the Middle East, they truly have 
become "Uthmän's shirt." A fine symbol to be waved around when you want recognition 
for your case and provide legitimacy to actions, but deep down little more than that—a 
torn-up bloody shirt displayed when it is politically useful. 
After years of hope and struggle, their fate may soon be signed away by a small 
group of men, devoid of legal background and experience, who have lived outside of the 
camps and the occupied territories for much of their lives, and whom the people did not 
elect. In a poll taken immediately after the announcement of the agreement, 81.2% of the 
people polled felt that they should have been consulted about the content of the 
agreement, but that did not happen (CPRS Poll #1, 1994. p. 3). Today, the PLO 
conducts further negotiations on the people's behalf with little regard for the refugees in 
the Diaspora, and Israel refuses to even include the refugee issue in official negotiations. 
American presence in the Oslo Peace Process, while absent at the moment of 
creation, became a central focus of the Clinton administration as the talks evolved. But 
without the inclusion of the Palestinian refugees as part of a just and reasonable solution, 
the United States will have omitted a most critical part of the Palestinian population. 
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As demonstrated in this paper, the Palestinians have a very strong and well- 
developed sense of identity, formed and sustained through years of destitution and 
dispossession in the schools, songs, and symbols of their camps and communities. They 
are not likely to "forget" that they are Palestinian or what that means because of a peace 
deal that does not address their rightful concerns as defined by the United Nations. 
The Palestinian refugee population has a proven record of being able and willing 
to organize and fight to defend its interests in the political and military arenas. Following 
a peace deal, that population will still exist, as will the wrongs committed against them. 
More importantly, these wrongs are not the idle claims of radical elements of an unhappy 
ethnic group; rather, they are the established rights of the Palestinians as defined by the 
international community that told the refugees that they had been wronged and that their 
grievances were legitimate. Telling refugees 50 years later that their sustaining and 
defining beliefs were unreasonable is sure to open a Pandora's box, regardless of the 
nationality of the men signing the rights away. 
The majority of the Palestinian population has never known "Palestine" and has 
come of age since the first Intifada knowing nothing of peace. Many feel humiliated and 
abandoned by the governments of the PA and the other Arab nations that are their 
supposed protectors.15 The governments of the West and of the East have failed them, 
and the system that is in place in the PA is not working. Should there be any surprise that 
they find broad appeal in the social services and promises of deliverance of the Islamists? 
In many camps and neighborhoods the Islamists provide the greatest prospects for hope, 
15
 In 2000, 71% of the population in the PA felt that their government was corrupt, and 59% believed the 
worst corruption is yet to come (CPRS Poll #48c, 2000, p. 3). 
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and they seem to be able to deliver on their words. Most importantly, they promise what 
the Palestinians desire most—simple justice. If it happens to be dressed in Islamist garb, 
then so be it. 
What would this continuing struggle look like? It would likely have much 
stronger Islamist and neofundamentalist tones than the current secular nationalist parties 
involved and would be younger, less educated, and likely more militant. This stands to 
reason, as the nationalist path that that they have followed for over 30 years has provided 
little improvement in their lives. Their anger would be directed against the West for its 
role in the original and subsequent dispossessions as well as the longevity (and 
legitimization) of the Diaspora; against the Arab nations for their lack of support and use 
of the Palestinians for political gain; and finally, against the Palestinian Authority itself 
for surrendering the struggle. 
In short, the refugee communities that would be left abroad to assimilate, 
forcefully relocated to third countries, or left in the West Bank/Gaza without 
compensation for their hardships, are likely to become prime sites from which to continue 
the struggle against their dispossession. Regardless of the agreement made by Israel and 
the PA regarding the final status of the refugees, the right of an individual to press his 
claim in court cannot be denied. This is because the right of repatriation and 
compensation is an individual human right, and a State possesses the ability to relinquish 
only "collective rights for which it is responsible" (Rempel, 1999. p. 41). Because of 
this, a bilateral agreement between Israel and the PA cannot extinguish an individual's 
right to settle his claim if the agreement between the two states is inadequate. It could 
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therefore be expected that the countries accepting Palestinians refugees would also be 
accepting potentially destabilizing political activism within their borders. 
B. UNITED STATES POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
It is naive to expect the words and deeds of the world's sole superpower to reflect 
each other perfectly at all times, as the realities of hegemony often call into conflict the 
notions of idealism and pragmatism. It would appear that much of the World is in fact 
naive, and the image of the United States is suffering as a result. Our oft-proclaimed 
platform of human rights, rule of law, and respect for self-determination has its roots in 
Wilsonian idealism. While the United States has fought to uphold these tenets in places 
such as Kosovo, Bosnia, and Haiti, they do not appear, in the eyes of much of the world, 
to apply to Arabs, especially not when a major U.S. client state is involved. 
"Wilsonian Idealism" with its notions of respect for international law, self- 
determination, and democracy, has become a prime American export. Perhaps it has 
taken hold too well, for the observers outside of the American body politic expect it to 
uniformly define the very way in which we conduct our dealings with all other nations. 
When this is seen to not be the reality, we are viewed as hypocrites and betrayers of 
various causes. Because of the Arab perception that the United States turns a blind eye to 
Israeli transgressions of international laws and treaties, our relations with the people, not 
necessarily the governments, of the Middle East has suffered greatly. Through our 
support, we become the great co-conspirators in every "Zionist" plot in the eyes of much 
of the Middle East. 
Complicating the matter further in this case is the fact that observers easily 
perceive non-involvement of the United States in the negotiations as favoring Israel. 
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Because of the overwhelming strength of Israel, and the dominating nature of the 
economic and security relationships between the two parties, Palestinians are at an 
immediate disadvantage in bilateral negotiations. To be sure, the system of governance 
and administration that is in place in the PA currently is not the one envisioned by the 
United States or the PLO when the Declaration of Principles was signed, but we now 
must deal with the results of our shortsightedness. Continuing to postpone the issue of 
refugee resolution until final status negotiations is a recipe for further conflict. Many 
Palestinians already see the negotiations to this point as the final act in their dispossession 
(Said, 1996. p. 4). 
Current solutions that call for the either/or approach to the right of return and 
compensation debate, the actual increase of Palestinians in the Diaspora (Table 4), and 
the decrease of Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza, are misguided. It is unrealistic to 
expect the Palestinians to settle for a small number of returnees to Palestine while most of 
them are absorbed into their host countries or once again forcibly resettled in third party 
states. Only strong support for legitimate16 Palestinian concerns together with 
appropriate pressures on the Israeli government can hope to bring about lasting peace to 
the region. It is often said that the maximum Israel is willing to give does not meet the 
minimum the Palestinians are willing to accept. This must be understood as a factor of 
Israeli domestic politics. No Israeli Prime Minister can make the changes necessary to 
bring about real peace without paying for it dearly as Yitzhak Rabin found out in 1995. 
This is one area where the interests of the United States and Israel clearly diverge. 
For most of the 20th century the United States was looked upon by the rest of the world 
as a champion of human rights, yet due largely to our perceived hypocrisy in regards to 
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Israel, for the first time in the history of the United Nations, America today does not hold 
a seat on the UN Human Rights commission (NYT, 5/4/01. p. 1). A continued stance of 
blind allegiance to Israel in the face of strong human rights condemnation by the rest of 
the world threatens our position of global leadership on anything but military and 
economic levels. 
The United States must put pressure on the Israeli government to make the needed 
concessions in regards to refugees, if for nothing else, to give the Government of Israel 
the ability to say that they were forced to give in by the United States and that they had 
no other choice. If done correctly, without sacrificing the special relationship between 
the United States and Israel, such action could conceivably be enough to resolve the 
conflict for all parties. 
That a large number of settlements would have to be abandoned seems to be a 
near certainty, and the system of interconnecting roads bisecting the Palestinian areas 
would have to largely disappear. As for refugee absorption, Israel has made plans on 
several occasions to absorb enormous numbers of Jewish settlers into the same territories 
the Palestinians are told cannot support their populations. It can be done with United 
States support. Not only would such actions bring an end to a long-standing conflict, 
they would do so while at the same time easing the leadership burden on regional allies 
whose populations would be robbed of their perennial demands for tougher action against 
Israel in the name of the Palestinians. For a modest cost domestically, the American 
government could improve the regional security situation throughout the Middle East and 
avoid the near certainty of continued conflict arising from the hasty conclusion of a peace 
deal. 
As defined by United Nations resolutions and international treaties germane to the conflict. 
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